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The growth of structural litigation, in which Federal judges mandate
basic reordering of bureaucratic institutions, has occasioned increasing
conflicts between courts and legislatures.' To implement their remedial
goals, institutional reform decrees frequently require increased appropria-
tions,2 the promulgation of new enabling legislation,3 or some other kind
of affirmative legislative performance." Legislators often resist these intru-
sions into what they conceive as their legitimate realm of discretion, refus-
ing to act in accordance with the judicial plan.
To prod legislatures into cooperation, courts have employed various
means, such as moral suasion or, in certain cases, the threat to close down
the offending institution.' When these methods prove ineffective, courts
may find themselves unable to implement their decrees. Recently, how-
ever, some courts have adopted more intrusive measures to overcome legis-
lative intransigence. This Term, the Supreme Court will review two cir-
cuit court decisions, Jenkins v. Missouri' and United States v. City of
Yonkers,7 which approved especially bold judicial initiatives in the face of
legislative resistance.
In Yonkers the Court will consider Judge Leonard Sand's efforts to
1. See Hanson, Contending Perspectives on Federal Court Efforts to Reform State Institutions,
59 U. COLO. L. REv. 289 (1988); Johnson, The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litiga-
tion, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271 (1981); Starr, Accommodation and Accountability: A Strategy forJudicial
Enforcement of Institutional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REV. 399 (1981).
2. Funding is almost always an issue in structural litigation. For a recent example, see Jenkins v.
Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988) (approving order of $260 million capital expenditure plan
for purpose of school desegregation), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (requir-
ing amendment of zoning ordinance and construction of housing), affd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988).
4. See, e.g., United States v. City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (requiring city
to enact resolution welcoming people of all races), affd in relevant part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
5. See Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 791 (1978) (emphasizing
importance of court's power to declare conditions illegitimate); Hirschhorn, Where the Money is: Rem-
edies to Finance Compliance with Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1849-51
(1984) (discussing court's option to close institution). Threats of closure prove effective only when the
institution is one that the court can credibly shut and that the legislature has a compelling interest in
keeping open. Prisons are probably the best example of this combination. See Id. at 1850-51.
6. 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
7. 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
1337 (1989).
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implement a remedy for segregation in schooling and housing in Yonkers,
New York. After protracted litigation, extending over eight years, Judge
Sand ordered members of the City Council, on pain of fine and imprison-
ment, to enact legislation required by a consent decree.' When the Coun-
cil rejected the legislation, Judge Sand imposed the penalties on the Coun-
cil members who voted against the legislation, and the Second Circuit
affirmed.9 The Supreme Court stayed the contempt orders1" and subse-
quently agreed to review the sanctions."
Jenkins concerns the means employed by Judge Russell Clark to fi-
nance a school desegregation plan in Kansas City, Missouri. When the
school district failed to obtain funding for a court-ordered desegregation
plan, Judge Clark ordered an increase in the local property tax and im-
posed a surtax on the state income tax for income earned within the dis-
trict. 2 While the Eighth Circuit overturned the income tax order, finding
it too great a break from existing methods of school finance, it affirmed
the property tax surcharge.13
8. United States v. Yonkers Bd. Of Educ., No. 80-6761 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1988) (order detailing
contempt penalties for not approving required legislation), affd sub nom. United States v. City of
Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989) (contempt sanctions
against City of Yonkers), cert. granted sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989)
(contempt sanctions against individual council members). The underlying constitutional violations that
Judge Sand sought to remedy are described in great detail in his original opinion, which found liabil-
ity for intentional discrimination in schooling and housing. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.,
624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2821 (1988).
9. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80-6761 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1988) (finding Council
members Chema, Fagan, and Longo in contempt); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80-
6761 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1988) (finding Council member Spallone in contempt retroactive to Aug. 2,
1988), affd sub nom. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted
sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989). Judge Sand also levied contempt fines
against the City of Yonkers which began at one dollar and doubled each day. United States v. Yonkers
Bd. of Educ., No. 80-6761 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1988) (finding City of Yonkers in contempt). The
Second Circuit affirmed these fines as well, although it ruled that they should double only until
reaching one million dollars per day and then continue at that level until the required legislation was
adopted. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339
(1989).
10. Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 14 (1988).
11. Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989). The Court granted certiorari even though
in the face of bankrupting fines against the City of Yonkers, which the Supreme Court refused to
stay, the Council members eventually did pass the required resolution. The Council members each
paid a total of $3500 in contempt fines for the period between the contempt order on August 2, 1988
and the Second Circuit's stay on August 9, 1988. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at A194n-A195n, In re Spallone, No. 88-854 (U.S.
filed Nov. 23, 1988); Brief for Petitioner Spallone at 8, Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1137
(1989) (No. 88-854), granting cert. to 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988); Brief for Petitioner at 16, Chema
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1137 (1989) (No. 88-856), granting cert. to 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988).
At the contempt hearing, Judge Sand ordered the Council members imprisoned if the resolution was
not passed by August 10, 1988. Because of subsequent stays by the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court, the Council members were not actually imprisoned for contempt.
12. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 855
F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989). Judge Clark imposed the taxes
directly, without legislative action, and ordered state and county tax officials to collect them. 672 F.
Supp. at 412-13.
13. 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
Legislative Injunction
These cases illustrate two related approaches to overcoming legislative
obstruction. The court can either order legislators to enact certain bills or
can circumvent the legislative process and create legislation by judicial de-
cree. Both of these options entail a court's apparent arrogation of tradi-
tionally legislative authority; both substitute the judge's decision as to the
positive content of the law for that of the legislature. This Note terms a
court order that serves to create legislation without any intervening legis-
lative discretion a "legislative injunction." A legislative injunction either
compels, or substitutes for, the enactment of a specific bill.14 This Note
considers the use of the legislative injunction as a means to counteract
unconstitutional legislative inaction.1 5
Courts have become accustomed to nullifying unconstitutional legisla-
tive action through the mechanism of judicial review. Counteracting un-
constitutional legislative inaction through a legislative injunction, how-
ever, appears to be a much greater violation of legislative prerogative. As
the City Council members argued in Yonkers, a court's threat to jail legis-
lators unless they vote for a particular bill seems at odds with well estab-
lished principles of legislative privilege." Similarly, a court's assumption
of the taxing power appears to be an arrogation of traditionally legislative
authority.1"
This Note argues that the legislative injunction is a legitimate exercise
of judicial authority, indeed as legitimate as a court's overturning uncon-
stitutional legislation through judicial review. The legislative injunction
accords with the understanding of the legislative role as deciding on the
general distribution of rights and resources and the judicial role as ensur-
14. Structural injunctions often substitute for legislative action in the sense that the remedies they
mandate could also have been enacted by a legislative body. Changing prison conditions or regulating
mental health care, for example, lie within the scope of the legislative power. However, the activities
that the court wishes to reform normally come under the routine supervision of administrative bodies,
and it is with these kinds of administrative operations that the court's order is normally concerned. By
contrast, the legislative injunction, as discussed in this Note, involves functions centrally identified
with legislative bodies, functions such as enacting legislation or raising funds that do not lend them-
selves to administrative delegation.
15. This Note will limit its focus to use of the legislative injunction by Federal courts against state
and local legislatures, which is the most common framework for structural litigation. The Note will
not examine the use of legislative injunctions by state courts, nor will it consider the special concerns
implicated in directing judicial decrees at the United States Congress.
16. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner Spallone at 19-41, Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1137
(1989) (No. 88-854), granting cert. to 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988); Brief for Petitioner at 24-32,
Chema v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1137 (1989) (No. 88-856), granting cert. to 856 F.2d 444 (2d
Cir. 1988).
The imprisonment of legislators for violating a judicial order as to how to vote on a bill is not
wholly unprecedented. In 1882 a judge jailed fifteen Brooklyn aldermen for voting, in defiance of a
court order, to override a mayoral veto of a change in the route of an elevated railway then under
construction. See People ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 1 Civ. Proc. Rep. 484, 486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd,
90 N.Y. 402 (1882); Richland, City of Brooklyn Aldermen and the Yonkers Councilmen, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 15, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
17. See Note, An Unorthodox Usurpation of Legislative Power in Jenkins v. Missouri, 21
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1269, 1286 (1988) (criticizing judge's levying tax as leading to "unconscionable
realignment of control between the legislative and judicial branches of government").
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ing that this allocation is accomplished fairly, without prejudicing the
rights of particular groups or individuals. The legislative injunction re-
sponds to a situation, such as a segregated school or an inhumane prison,
in which legislative inaction will cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights. By mandating a particular action, the court assures that the legisla-
ture cannot exercise its "discretion" not to act and thereby impair individ-
uals' constitutional rights. This role for the court in defining the bounds
of legislative discretion falls squarely within the traditional understanding
of judicial authority.
Nor does the legislative injunction conflict with legislative immunity
doctrine. In deciding the proper scope of legislative immunity, courts have
developed an understanding of the proper domain of discretion in order to
distinguish those acts of legislators that are truly "legislative," hence
shielded by immunity, from those that are "non-legislative" and do not
enjoy this protection. Building on this distinction, the Note finds the legiti-
macy of legislative injunctions well grounded in immunity law principles.
By their very nature, legislative injunctions usurp no legitimate legislative
power. Instead they give expression to the evolving constitutional bound-
aries of legislative discretion, refusing to treat inaction as a privileged ex-
ercise of legislative authority. By contrast, a formal view of legislative pre-
rogative which rejects the legislative injunction declares that not the Con-
stitution, but the status quo, is supreme.
Section I explores the need for legislative injunctions and examines
prior court decisions addressing the confrontation of legislatures and
courts in structural litigation. Section II considers the development of leg-
islative immunity doctrine with particular attention to the policy/imple-
mentation and the discretionary/ministerial distinctions that have devel-
oped in legislative immunity law. Section III expands on these immunity
doctrines to develop a theory of legislative injunctions as tools to ensure
that legislators do not deprive individuals of constitutional rights by failing
to perform constitutionally mandated duties.
I. LEGISLATIVE RESISTANCE AND JUDICIAL REACTION
Although Federal courts enjoy broad equitable powers to fashion reme-
dies for constitutional violations,18 they may have difficulty implementing
their decrees without the compliance of state and local legislatures. The
most common area in which legislative assistance is required is in the
financing of remedial orders. Whether they seek to improve prison condi-
tions, reform mental hospitals, or desegregate schools, structural remedies
inevitably involve increased spending, and the appropriation power has a
strong historical and constitutional tie to the legislature. 9 Remedial orders
18. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
19. The Constitution commits the Federal appropriation power to the legislature and, specifically,
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may also require other kinds of enabling acts, such as zoning changes,
which are within the traditionally legislative sphere of authority. Whether
based on principled disagreement or mere parsimony, legislatures are not
always willing to enact the necessary legislation.
When courts have come into conflict with legislatures, the Supreme
Court has generally refused to allow claims of autonomy to prevent the
implementation of constitutional remedies. Since Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,20 conflicts between courts and legislatures have often arisen in the
context of school desegregation decisions. The Supreme Court has sug-
gested that courts may indeed order local bodies to levy taxes if necessary
to ensure compliance with a prior remedial order. When a school board in
Prince Edward County, Virginia, closed the public schools to avoid a de-
segregation decree, while providing tax incentives to private, segregated
schools, the Court in Griffin v. County School Board2 stated that the
district court could order the school supervisors to levy the taxes required
to re-open the schools and to run them without racial discrimination.22
The lower Federal courts have disagreed on how broadly to interpret
the Supreme Court's warrant for interfering in local taxing decisions.2"
Generally, courts have insisted that judges show all possible deference to
local revenue processes, intervening only as a last resort. In Evans v.
Buchanan,24 for example, the Third Circuit reviewed a judge's decision
overturning a legislatively-established tax rate that he believed inadequate
to fund a desegregation remedy. While not reaching the merits of the dis-
trict court's order, the Third Circuit granted a writ of mandamus vacating
the order and requiring a new hearing on the grounds that the lower
court refused to give a presumption of constitutionality to the legislative
action. The Third Circuit objected to the district judge's failing to show
"the requisite deference to which legislative judgments in the field of taxa-
tion are entitled."'2 5
When alternatives have been exhausted, courts have used Griffin to jus-
tify ordering tax increases. The Eighth Circuit has been particularly will-
to the chamber closest to the people. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7-8; see Stith, Congress' Power of the
Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988). In the state context, the Supreme Court has recognized the close
connection of the taxing power to the state legislature. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920);
Comment, Liddell v. Missouri: Financing the Ancillary Costs of Public School Desegregation
Through a Court-Ordered Tax Increase, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269 (1985).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
22. Id. at 233. Since an order to levy taxes was not yet necessary, the proposition that the district
court had a right to issue such an order could be considered dictum, but nothing in the opinion
suggested that this aspect of the ruling was speculative or purely hypothetical. The lower courts never
had occasion actually to force the Board to levy taxes, but did direct the Board to recoup private
tuition grants made in violation of a court order. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 363 F.2d 206 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966).
23. See Comment, supra note 19, at 277-82; Note, Judicial Taxation in Segregation Cases, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 332, 332-37 (1989).
24. 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S 923 (1980).
25. Id. at 778.
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ing to sanction court-ordered taxation. 6 In United States v. Missouri
the Eighth Circuit reviewed a district judge's decision to impose a tax
when he believed local authorities would not approve the necessary fund-
ing measures. While reversing the particular plan as potentially unneces-
sary, the court indicated approval for the notion of a judicially imposed
tax.28 In Liddell v. Missouri,29 a decision on which Judge Clark relied
heavily in Jenkins,30 the Eighth Circuit reiterated its interpretation of
Griffin as authorizing courts to order tax increases in the absence of fiscal
alternatives. In Liddell the court found support for its holding both in
Griffin and in the case law surrounding the contracts clause,31 an area in
which Federal courts have long had occasion to intervene in local taxing
and spending decisions.32
The Supreme Court has also made clear that general principles of state
sovereignty will not be allowed to block the implementation of constitu-
tional remedies. In Milliken v. Bradley33 the Court established that a
state itself, if found responsible for school segregation, could be required
to help fund the remedy. By holding that neither the Tenth Amendment
nor the Eleventh Amendment would shield states from liability for pro-
spective relief, 4 the Court reaffirmed that Federal judges need not allow
deference to non-Federal government structures to impede the implemen-
tation of remedial orders.35
An important prerequisite for all judicial intrusions into local legislative
decisions, especially those concerning tax policy, has been the determina-
tion of a constitutional violation. Courts have been wary of coercing legis-
26. See Note, supra note 23, at 336-37.
27. 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
28. Id. at 1372-73.
29. Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
30. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 411-12 (W.D. Mo. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
31. "No State shall . . . pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
32. The Liddell court specifically relied on Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans,
215 U.S. 170 (1909), in which the Supreme Court held that a court could order a city to levy and
collect a tax for the benefit of creditors who had been promised the tax revenues. The City of New
Orleans had attempted to avoid honoring a judgment that resulted from a contractual obligation to
pay certain tax revenues to the metropolitan police board. The Supreme Court ruled that the city
could be required "to pay over the taxes for which the judgment was rendered, or to levy and collect a
tax therefor." 215 U.S. at 181.
33. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
34. See id. at 288-91.
35. The Court has ruled that separation of powers constraints apply only to the relationship
between coordinate branches of government, not to conflicts between Federal courts and state govern-
ments. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 855
F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding separation of powers principle inapplicable to court-ordered tax
levy), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989). Further, the Court has indicated that the immunity that
the Eleventh Amendment grants is available only to a state government, not to a local political subdi-
vision. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 n.12 (1974); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S.
529, 530 (1890). For a criticism of the Supreme Court's refusal to use separation of powers principles
to limit Federal courts' intervention into state governments' activities, see Nagel, Separation of Powers
and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STArN. L. REV. 661 (1978).
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lative cooperation in implementing a remedy resulting from a consent
judgment, rather than from a finding of liability."6 This general judicial
reluctance to enforce consent judgments becomes particularly pronounced
when the legislature is not a formal party to the settlement. In these cir-
cumstances courts are hesitant to impute an affirmative duty to the legis-
lature to fund the agreed upon measures.
Despite a consent judgment entered into by the Governor of New York,
for example, the state legislature refused to provide funding for a plan to
remedy unconstitutional conditions at the Willowbrook mental institu-
tion."7 The Second Circuit ruled that the district court could not coerce
compliance by holding the Governor and Comptroller in contempt.3 8 The
district court apparently did not attempt to order legislative compliance
directly, but the Second Circuit opinion seemed to foreclose such an ac-
tion, warning that a court should not put itself " 'in the difficult position
of trying to enforce a direct order . . . to raise and allocate large sums of
money,. . . steps traditionally left to appropriate executive and legislative
bodies responsible to the voters.' "" The court stressed its belief that the
legislature was not guilty of a constitutional violation and therefore was
not subject to the broad remedial power of the court.40 The Second Circuit
reached this conclusion despite the long history of horrendous conditions
at the state-run Willowbrook facility. The Second Circuit thus tacitly
blessed a pas de deux in which the Governor claimed that legislative inac-
tion rendered his compliance impossible, while the legislature had no af-
firmative obligation to facilitate an agreement to which it was not a for-
mal party.'1
In Brewster v. Dukakis,'2 the First Circuit similarly limited the ability
of the district court to implement a consent decree concerning the provi-
sion of mental health services. When the legislature refused to fund the
program that the Governor had promised in the consent decree, the First
Circuit stated that the district court had no remedy against the legislature
and that, in seeking to fund the program, the district court could not go
beyond requiring the executive to exercise the "best efforts" demanded by
the consent decree.4' District courts have faced analogous restrictions in
36. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1084 (1984).
37. For a description of the conditions at Willowbrook and the prolonged litigation seeking to
remedy them, see D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984).
38. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162 (1980).
39. 631 F.2d at 165 (quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 341 (2d Cir. 1974)).
40. Id. at 166. But see Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 678
F.2d 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982) (legislature's refusal to appropriate funds
provides no defense to contempt citation against executive branch defendants for refusing to comply
with consent decree).
41. The Governor's position gained further strength from the wording of the consent decree,
which made executive action contingent on any legislative approval required under state law. 631
F.2d at 163.
42. 675 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).
43. Id. at 2.
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trying to implement consent decrees to remedy unconstitutional prison
conditions.""
In sum, when long-standing legislative inaction directly violates a
court's remedial order issued after a finding of a constitutional violation,
courts have generally assumed broad powers to force legislative compli-
ance. When, instead, there has been no judicial determination of liability
and the legislative inaction violates no direct judicial order, courts are
wary of coercing legislative cooperation. This insistence on a formal decla-
ration of liability represents judges' justifiable reluctance to arrogate ap-
parently legislative functions without a clear determination of official der-
eliction of duty. An agreement between two parties may well not provide
a sufficient foundation for ordering the enactment of a specific bill or for
circumventing the legislature altogether.' 5 Courts have thus even been
willing to arrogate part of the legislature's taxing and spending power,
though only after a particular constitutional violation has received judicial
definition. In their role as guarantors of constitutional rights, courts have
found justification for altering the general principle that appropriations
decisions must rest with the people's elected representatives.
II. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
The doctrine of legislative immunity represents an area in which courts
have been particularly sympathetic to claims of legislative autonomy. This
Section argues, however, that the legislative injunction accords with ex-
isting legislative immunity doctrine, as well as with the justifications un-
derlying the general policy of immunity for public officials. Indeed, legis-
lative immunity decisions elaborate a functional definition of legislative
conduct that provides support for a court's assertion of power through a
legislative injunction. As the cases make clear, legislative immunity does
not exempt all conduct by legislators from judicial scrutiny.
Legislative immunity doctrine in the United States rests on vestiges of
English tradition, deference to the people's democratically elected repre-
sentatives, and more general principles of official immunity. An inheri-
tance of the struggles in England between the Crown and Parliament,"'
legislative immunity has a long history in America. Most Colonial consti-
tutions provided for legislative privilege, and that right was strongly de-
fended as a sign of Colonial independence in the face of conflict with
44. See Jensen v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 763 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1985); Newman v. Grad-
dick, 740 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
45. In this, as in other ways, settlements may be more difficult to enforce than adjudications on
the merits. For a discussion of the problems inherent in settling institutional reform suits, see Fiss,
supra note 36.
46. See C. WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (1970). Wittke
takes care to specify some of the peculiarly English factors underlying Parliamentary privilege, such
as the Crown's control of the court system and the historical connection between Parliamentary privi-
lege and the judicial function of the High Court of Parliament. See id. at 182-98.
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Crown governors. 7 The Federal Constitution seeks to protect legislative
independence by guaranteeing freedom from civil arrest"" and freedom of
speech and debate 9 to members of Congress.50 While the Constitution
provides no specific immunity for state legislators, the Supreme Court
held in Tenney v. Brandhove that state legislators enjoyed a common law
immunity that shielded them from Federal civil rights suits.51 The Court
found that Congress could not have intended to abrogate traditional legis-
lative immunity when it enacted the civil rights legislation in the post-
Civil War era.52
In 1979, The Court extended this immunity to "regional" legislators.
In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,53 local
property owners attempted to sue members of the governing board of the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, alleging that a land use ordinance de-
prived them of the beneficial use of their property. The Court held that
the members of the board of the bi-state agency were absolutely immune
if they were acting in a legislative capacity. While the Court's opinion
expressly left open the issue of extending a similar immunity to local leg-
islators,54 its reasoning seemed to demand such an extension. The opinion
emphasized the special status of legislative activity with little reference to
its level of operation.5" Accordingly, the eight circuits that.have since ad-
dressed the issue have found legislative immunity available to local
officials. 56
47. See M. CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES (1943).
48. "They [Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach
of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
49. "[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Members of Congress] shall not be ques-
tioned in any other Place." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, ci. 1.
50. On the relationship of the speech or debate clause to English parliamentary privilege, see
Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat
to Legislative Coequality, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1019 (1974); Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative
Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973).
51. 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). Brandhove, a critic of the California Senate Fact-Finding Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities, claimed that the committee and its chairman had deprived him of his
civil rights through various acts of harassment. The Supreme Court ruled that the committee and its
members were absolutely immune from such a suit, provided that they "were acting in the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity." Id.
52. Justice Frankfurter expressed this view by way of a forceful rhetorical question: "Did Con-
gress by the general language of its 1871 statute mean to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom
achieved in England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National
Governments here?" 341 U.S. at 376.
For a discussion of common law legislative immunity in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see
Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
482, 491-504 (1982); Comment, A New Perspective on Legislative Immunity in Section 1983 Ac-
tions, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1087 (1981) (rejecting function-based immunity and proposing balancing
test). See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV.
1133, 1197-1204 (1977) (reviewing legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial immunity in § 1983
actions).
53. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
54. Id. at 404 n.26.
55. Id. at 405.
56. See Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988); Aitchison v.
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The official immunity strain of legislative immunity is strong, with
courts being primarily concerned that the exercise of legislative power not
be hampered by threat of lawsuit.5" Justice Frankfurter explained in Ten-
ney that legislative privilege was meant to protect the "public good," as
fear of legal retribution might hamper the "uninhibited discharge" of leg-
islative duty."8 Even claims of "unworthy purpose" should not defeat the
privilege, Frankfurter argued, because the need to defend oneself in court
would create a distraction from legislative business.59
The use of the legislative injunction in situations such as those in Yon-
kers and Jenkins poses no threat to general official immunity policies. In
those cases, the legislative injunction followed a judicial finding that in-
strumentalities of the state government had violated the Constitution.
Once a court has found the governmental body liable for unconstitutional
practices, official immunity principles do not reach the conduct of officials
who impede a judge's remedial orders. Defending themselves in court
against aggrieved constituents might interfere with legislators' perform-
ance of their official duties, but answering to a Federal judge seeking to
remedy a proven constitutional violation hardly impedes legitimate public
functions.
General official immunity principles, however, do not fully express the
special deference for legislators recognized in legislative immunity doc-
trine. The immunity that the Court has defined for legislators extends
beyond that granted to other government officials. Most public officials
are shielded only by a conditional, "good faith," immunity. Judges do en-
joy absolute immunity, but only against claims for damages. Legislative
immunity, on the other hand, covers claims for damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees.60
Even this broad doctrinal protection recognizes some limits on legisla-
tive independence. To qualify for immunity, an act must fall within the
Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 98-100 (3d Cir. 1983); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952-53
(7th Cir. 1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1039 (1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982);
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 907 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 274-80 (4th Cir. 1980); Gorman Towers, Inc. v.
Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-14 (8th Cir. 1980).
57. For a discussion of the policy justifications underlying official immunity, see P. SCHUCK, SU-
ING GOVERNMENT 89-99 (1983).
58. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
59. Id.
60. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Schwartz, Legislative
Immunity Developments, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 18, 1988, at 3, col. 1. The Supreme Court has affirmed this
broad immunity for state legislators by analogy to the protection afforded to Congressmen and Sena-
tors by the speech or debate clause. See Supreme Court of Va., 446 U.S. at 733. State legislators thus
benefit from the constitutional protection of Federal legislators, even though the Court has distin-
guished between the scope of Federal and state legislators' rights. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock,
445 U.S. 360 (1980) (refusing to extend evidentiary privilege guaranteed by speech or debate clause to
state legislator in criminal trial).
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sphere of legitimate legislative activity.61 The Supreme Court has adopted
a "functional" approach in addressing issues of official immunity, 2 and
courts have generally not been deferential to the formal appearance of
legislative activity in defining the scope of local legislative immunity.S In
deciding questions of local legislative immunity in Federal civil rights
cases, courts have often sought to determine whether an action is legisla-
tive, hence immunized, by reference to the underlying substantive issue,
rather than to the nominal character of the decision-making body. Courts
have limited legislative immunity to actions of a general, policy-setting
nature. Legislators have not enjoyed immunity for decisions directed to a
more particular, individualized result, especially when the action
prejudices the rights of one specific individual or group.
In Cutting v. Muzzey," which concerned a town planning board's con-
sideration of a subdivision plan, the First Circuit analyzed decisions by a
local body based on the nature of the underlying facts and on the particu-
larity of the impact. If the decision rested on general policy determinations
and did not seek to single out individuals, then it was considered to be
legislative. If the decision was more specific in purpose and effect, it was
deemed not legislative, but administrative. Official decisions of the same
body performed according to the same formal process could thus be legis-
lative or non-legislative, depending upon the subject of the action.
Other courts have made a similar distinction between legislative acts
which set public policy priorities and administrative actions which do not
express the legislative prerogative to assert general policy goals.6 5 The dis-
61. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
62. See Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 542 (1988).
63. By contrast, in interpreting the scope of congressional immunity under the speech or debate
clause, this "functional" approach has been employed with great deference. In Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880), the Supreme Court held that congressional immunity applies to "things gener-
ally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." Id. at
204. Thus, voting, see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), preparing and delivering
speeches, see United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), and various investigative activities, see
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), have been held to be absolutely
protected without regard to the content of the action. In Kilbourn, the Court indicated that some
congressional conduct might be so outrageous as to be unprotected by the speech or debate clause:
It is not necessary to decide here that there may not be things done, in the one House or the
other, of an extraordinary character, for which the members who take part in the act may be
held legally responsible. If we could suppose the members of these bodies so far to forget their
high functions and the noble instrument under which they act as to imitate the Long Parlia-
ment in the execution of the Chief Magistrate of the nation, or to follow the example of the
French Assembly in assuming the function of a court for capital punishment we are not pre-
pared to say that such an utter perversion of their powers to a criminal purpose would be
screened from punishment by the constitutional provision for freedom of debate.
103 U.S. at 204-05. The Court has apparently never invoked this "regicide-or-its-moral-equivalent"
exception.
64. 724 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1984).
65. See, e.g., de Botton v. Marple Township, 689 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (denial of zoning
amendment administrative, not legislative, act); Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of Horseheads, 551 F.
Supp. 1066 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (denial of planned unit development application not legislative). But see
Donivan v. Dallastown Borough, 835 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1987) (determining if act is legislative based
on formal process of adoption), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1596 (1988). For criticisms of Donivan, see
The Yale Law Journal
trict court in Rateree v. Rockett66 summarized this line of local legislative
immunity law: "[W]ell-established (if murky) doctrine indicates some leg-
islative enactments, if they affect particular and not general interests, are
'administrative' and not 'legislative.' "817 These cases recognize that not all
actions a legislature takes come within the bounds of traditional legislative
discretion. The legislative injunction develops the analogous principle that
the failure to take certain actions also falls outside the realm of legitimate
legislative prerogative.
The extent to which prior court action defining particular duties may
transform a legislative into a non-legislative decision has not been ad-
dressed in recent immunity decisions. This issue did arise, though was not
resolved, early in this century in Virginia v. West Virginia.8 In this case,
which came before the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction, Virginia
sought to have the Court force West Virginia to pay its share of the debt
that existed before the states split. In its argument before the Court, Vir-
ginia asserted that since a judgment had been entered against West Vir-
ginia, the legislature of West Virginia had assumed a duty to take the
steps necessary to appropriate the required funds. Although the Court
could not compel the exercise of discretion, Virginia argued, the Court
could order the performance of a non-discretionary task by the legislature.
While the necessary action might appear to be within the protected sphere
of legislative prerogative, in fact the legislature had an "absolute ministe-
rial duty"69 to comply with the prior court order. In its decision, the Su-
preme Court contented itself with expressing the general right of Federal
courts to enforce judgments against states, and subsequent compliance by
West Virginia relieved the Court of the obligation to specify what kind of
judicial order would be appropriate.
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF LEGISLATIVE INJUNCTIONS
The premise of the legislative injunction is that the court has deter-
mined that the Constitution requires certain legislative actions and that
the legislature has nevertheless refused to comply. Only when the legisla-
ture has failed to abide by a clear definition of a constitutional duty does
the court take the step of directly ordering the legislature to enact a par-
Schwartz, supra note 60. See also Ditch v. Board of County Comm'rs, 650 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (D.
Kan. 1986) (discussing different tests for distinguishing between legislative and administrative acts);
Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1510-11 (1978) (discussing distinction
between legislative and administrative acts in zoning context).
66. 630 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. I1. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988).
67. Id. at 770; see also Jodeco, Inc. v. Hann, 674 F. Supp. 488, 495-96 (D.N.J. 1987) (in suit
challenging rezoning and denial of use variance, policy-setting Planning Board enjoys absolute immu-
nity, policy-implementing Zoning Board does not); Ditch v. Board of County Comm'rs, 650 F. Supp.
1245, 1250 (D. Kan. 1986) (abolition of employment position, unlike specific hiring decision, is abso-
lutely immune since former "implicates policy decisionmaking").
68. 246 U.S. 565 (1918).
69. Id. at 572 n.1 (argument for petitioners).
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ticular bill or of circumventing the legislative process. The terms in which
the Supreme Court has described the proper use of a Federal court's re-
medial power apply here, as well: "Judicial authority enters only when
local authority defaults."70 The examples of the desegregation orders in
Yonkers and in Jenkins illustrate the use of legislative injunctions as in-
struments of last resort.
A. The Examples of Yonkers and Jenkins
The extent of legislative defiance confronting Judge Sand in Yonkers
was extreme. The underlying lawsuit had been filed more than seven
years earlier, and almost three years had passed since he had found the
City of Yonkers liable for intentional segregation in schooling and in
housing. 1 After prolonged resistance to a Housing Remedy Order entered
by the court, 72 the City Council had finally approved a consent decree in
January 1988.7 3 The consent judgment included an agreement to adopt
legislation providing for zoning changes. It was the refusal to enact this
promised legislation that finally triggered the direct court order and, even-
tually, the imposition of contempt sanctions on the Council members who
refused to vote in favor of the required resolution.
The Yonkers case represents the paradigmatic instance in which a legis-
lative injunction infringes on no legitimate legislative prerogative. In re-
sponse to a finding of constitutional violation, the City Council had previ-
ously agreed to enact the specific resolution that was the subject of Judge
Sand's order. The City Council members had clearly already exercised all
permissible discretion. The act of passing the zoning changes in these cir-
cumstances resembled more the ministerial performance of a well-defined
legal obligation than the discretionary outcome of legislative deliberation.
While the prior consent decree made the lack of legislative discretion par-
ticularly clear in this instance, in fact the discretion of state and local
legislators is always limited by the requirements of the Constitution.74
In Jenkins, Judge Clark similarly resorted to a legislative injunction
only after the regular political process had been exhausted. The Kansas
City, Missouri School District had presented to the voters a bond issue
and, on four separate occasions, a tax increase plan, but the voters rejected
70. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
71. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 837 F.2d
1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988).
72. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), af/'d, 837 F.2d
1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988).
73. In Yonkers, unlike some of the suits discussed in Section I, the consent judgment concerned
only the remedy phase of the litigation, which followed an adjudication of liability for constitutional
violations.
74. The Constitution itself explicitly requires that state legislators pledge to abide by its dictates:
"[TIhe members of the several State Legislatures ...shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution .... ." U.S. CONsr. art. VI.
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each proposal. 5 The state legislature had also refused to help the school
district raise the necessary funds.78 It was following the failure of these
conventional methods that Judge Clark imposed the tax directly, empha-
sizing that the court-ordered tax hike was only a measure of last resort.
He stressed that he was "reluctant"77 to order a tax, but that the legisla-
tive and popular resistance left him with no choice, for "a majority has no
right to deny others the constitutional guarantees to which they are enti-
tled."78 In these circumstances, he believed that he had "no alternative but
to impose tax measures."'7  Again, the Federal court intervened in the lo-
cal governmental process after first clearly defining the constitutional re-
quirements and allowing the legislature an opportunity to comply
voluntarily.
The choice of a particular taxing scheme clearly does implicate larger
policy concerns. However, given a finding of constitutional necessity, the
legislature had discretion only to choose among various revenue schemes;
it did not have discretion to adopt no fundraising plan. Judge Clark's
decrees did not arrogate legislative authority, but rather sought to cabin
legislative prerogative within constitutional bounds. The legislature had
discretion to decide how to raise revenues, but not whether to do so. A
variety of legislative alternatives conformed to the constitutional mandate,
but some options did not, and one of these unacceptable actions was to do
nothing at all.80 By threatening to raise revenues himself, and finally or-
dering a tax, Judge Clark ensured that legislative inaction would not serve
as an unreviewable mechanism for thwarting constitutional rights. By
changing the background environment confronting the legislature, he
transformed the extraordinary situation of a legislature's blocking a reme-
dial order into the "normal" model of judicial review. Any action of the
legislature was, as always, subject to judicial oversight, while legislative
inaction presented no threat, since the status quo baseline (here, a court-
ordered tax hike) suffered from no constitutional infirmity. The legisla-
ture then had an allowable measure of discretion. By acting or failing to
act, it chose between different proposals that did not offend constitutional
principles.81
75. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 412.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (quoting Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972)):
The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school
system suggests that "there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solv-
ing them," and that, within the limits of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the
problems" should be entitled to respect.
In Jenkins the legislature made essentially no effort to tackle the funding problem.
81. In Evans v. Buchanan, the district judge explicitly invited the legislature to alter the tax rate
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Judge Clark may not have arrived at the specific funding plan that both
vindicated constitutional rights and best conformed to the legitimate policy
goals of the legislature.3 2 A judge's inability to account for all the factors
that a legislature would normally consider does imply that a legislative
injunction has a policy "cost": The judge may not be able to pick the best,
by any measure, of the constitutional alternatives available. However, an
unwise judicial choice (or even the possibility of one) may spur a reluctant
legislature into action. To the extent that legislative action in the first
instance is preferable to a legislative injunction, for reasons of institutional
competence, democratic accountability, and perhaps symbolic resonance,
this kind of "penalty" default rule may even be desirable.8"
B. The Limits of the Legislative Injunction
The legislative injunction, like judicial review, is counter-majoritarian
in that it places the vindication of constitutional rights above the current
will of the citizens and their representatives. Indeed, as an affirmative
counter-majoritarian attack on a representative body, the legislative in-
junction may seem a doubly "deviant" institution in a democracy.84 In-
he had established, so long as the substituted rate provided sufficient funds for the desegregation
remedy:
It is with deep seated reluctance overcome only be [sic] the pressing, immediate necessity and
the realization that no other option is available to fill the legislative void that the Court be-
comes involved at all in matters of taxation ...
The Court is compelled, however, to order that a tax rate be established. This action is
taken with the understanding that the Legislature can alter the parameters authorized. Be-
cause state political processes are preferred over even limited intervention by a Federal court,
the Delaware Legislature may raise or lower the tax authorization established here.
Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1026 (D. Del.), affd in part, vacated in part, 582 F.2d 750
(3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S 923 (1980). The legislature proceeded to enact a tax
rate that the court found inadequate. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
82. The Eighth Circuit's reversal of Judge Clark's income tax plan indicates that the substance of
his order was at least open to reasonable disagreement. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295,
1315-16 (8th Cir. 1988).
83. For an elaboration of the concept of "penalty defaults," see Ayers & Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95-107 (1989).
84. See A. BICKEL, THE LE sT DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962). The legislative injunction does
have firm foundations in various theories of judicial review. In line with process-based justifications,
such as that of John Hart Ely, the beneficiaries of structural litigation tend to be exactly those persons
whose interests are systematically underrepresented in a democracy-prisoners, mental patients, and
black schoolchildren, for example. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIStRuST (1980); see also United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting role for judicial review in
correcting flaws in political process). Structural litigation provides remedies for those whose interests
are acknowledged to require special protection from legislative action. The legislative injunction recog-
nizes that these same people require special protection from legislative inaction, as well.
The legislative injunction also finds support in recent unapologetic defenses of judicial review as a
peculiarly American democratic insight. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Consti-
tution, 93 YALE. L.J. 1013 (1984). While the legislative branch generally constitutes the most direct
measure of the people's will, in certain situations the courts must step in to assert their mandate to
represent the people. In ordering remedies to constitutional violations, the courts speak with the direct
authority of (We) the people. The democratic justification for protecting the legislature against the
judiciary is at its weakest in such moments. The Constitution, as the highest embodiment of American
democratic aspirations, overrides the will of a particular majority at a particular time. This demo-
cratic argument for judicial review gains added force when it is a local legislature (or even a local
The Yale Law Journal
stances may arise in which the legislative inaction that the injunction seeks
to overcome runs counter to the desire of the constituents, but the main
purpose of the legislative injunction is not to remedy such flaws in the
political system.8 5 The legislative injunction is not a substitute for electo-
ral accountability. Rather, the legislative injunction will most commonly
be employed in cases such as Jenkins, in which the legislative inaction
may well represent the will of the majority. In Jenkins the legislature
merely followed the preferences that the people had expressed in various
popular referenda. Such a powerful counter-majoritarian tool must clearly
be employed with restraint.
The Yonkers and Jenkins cases help illustrate the limits courts should
observe in invoking the legislative injunction. The distinction between set-
tled and adjudicated resolutions discussed earlier86 provides one check on
judicial overreaching. Majoritarian concerns may legitimately curb a
court's discretion in enforcing a remedy arising from a consent judgment
that includes no finding of liability. As this Note argues, the Constitution
may well require the displacement of the legislature, but only after a judi-
cial determination of constitutional necessity. Thus, parents of schoolchil-
dren cannot conspire with a sympathetic school board to force a legislature
to increase appropriations-unless a court determines that the funds are
constitutionally required.
In enforcing legislative injunctions, judges must also exercise care to
respect local government structures to as great an extent as possible.
While remaining committed to their remedial plans, judges should seek to
avoid full-blown confrontations with local officials. In this regard, Judge
Clark's plan of decreeing the desired legislative enactment, thus obviating
the need to threaten the legislature with contempt sanctions or other coer-
cive measures, seems attractive. Judge Clark would clearly have preferred
that the legislature itself act. He did not dispute that appropriation deci-
sions are best made by the people and their representatives, rather than by
a judge, but he refused to let deference to legislative discretion paralyze
the remedial process.
In Yonkers, Judge Sand followed the more confrontational path of forc-
ing the legislative body to act. He sought the City Council vote for sym-
bolic, as well as instrumental reasons. Counsel for the Yonkers branch of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, one of
electorate) that seeks to oppose the constitutional mandate. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
85. In some instances, the Supreme Court has intervened in legislative affairs for the purpose of
ensuring that members of the legislature did not thwart the representative process by such means as
gerrymandering or refusing to seat legally elected legislators. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969) (barring House of Representatives from excluding elected Congressman); Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. 116 (1966) (barring Georgia House of Representatives from excluding elected legislator); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (affirming justiciability of challenge to state apportionment plan).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 36-44.
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the plaintiffs in the case, urged Judge Sand to displace the City Council
and to appoint a special commission to implement the housing plan rather
than to impose contempt sanctions.8 7 Judge Sand nevertheless persisted in
seeking compliance by the Council. Defending this decision, Judge Sand
cited a "philosophical or symbolic" justification for his action:
[T]here does have to come a moment of truth, a moment of reckon-
ing, a moment when the City of Yonkers seeks not to become the
national symbol of defiance to civil rights and to heap shame upon
shame upon itself, but to recognize its obligation to conform to the
laws of the land and not step by step, order by order, but in the way
in which any responsible community concerned about the welfare of
its citizens functions.8"
Judge Sand may well have been justified in seeing the capitulation of
the Council as an intrinsic part of the process of removing racial discrimi-
nation in Yonkers. The conduct of the Council members certainly did
challenge the authority of a Federal court in a manner reminiscent of the
early school desegregation cases, if on a much smaller scale. Nevertheless,
the idea of jailing legislators because they refuse to vote in a particular
manner conflicts with deeply held democratic values, as was apparent
from the tremendous public attention the Yonkers case received. The large
contempt fines levied on the city, which eventually succeeded in coercing
passage of the required legislation, raise additional policy questions. By
threatening their jobs and services, Judge Sand, in effect, forced the peo-
ple of Yonkers into obedience. The result of noncompliance was a kind of
group punishment. The Yonkers contempt sanctions probably came close
to the boundary where coercive measures become in fact the sort of puni-
tive sanctions impermissible in a civil contempt adjudication. 9 Whatever
the merits of Judge Sand's actions in Yonkers, it will clearly be only the
rare case in which this use of enormous contempt sanctions will prove
desirable. More often, circumventing the legislative process will prove
more efficient and more equitable. It is one thing to place the principles of
87. See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1988, § 12WC (Westchester Weekly), at 1, col. 1. If a party fails to
perform an act ordered by a court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a judge to order the
act to be performed by another person with the same legal effect as if done by the party:
If a judgment directs a party . . . to perform any . . . specific act and the party fails to
comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done . . . by some other
person appointed by the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 70.
88. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80-6761 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 2, 1988) (contempt
hearing).
89. See, e.g., Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947) (civil contempt fines must be coer-
cive, not punitive). Concern about the size of the fines led the Second Circuit to modify Judge Sand's
scheme so that the City's fines would double each day, but only up to a maximum level of one million
dollars per day. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1339 (1989).
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the Constitution above the current will of the majority; it is another mat-
ter to try to change that will by contempt orders.
C. Affirmative Duties in an Activist State
Commentators sometimes distinguish between a "negative" and a "posi-
tive" conception of constitutional rights." The negative view insists that
the Constitution seeks to protect individual freedom by shielding the citi-
zen from government overreaching. This conception emphasizes the dan-
ger of the legislature's meddling in affairs beyond the scope of its legiti-
mate authority. As one nineteenth-century source expresses this sentiment,
"No man's life, liberty or property are safe while the Legislature is in
session.91 A more recent statement of the negative rights position appears
in an opinion by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit: "[Tlhe Constitu-
tion is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who
wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that Government might do
too little for the people but that it might do too much to them."9 2 Positive
rights theorists, by contrast, find in the Constitution a mandate for gov-
ernment intervention to secure individual liberty. They argue for an af-
firmative government obligation to provide for basic needs, such as educa-
tion and a minimum income.93
The Supreme Court has recognized positive government duties in cer-
tain situations.9" The Court, for example, has determined that the Sixth
Amendment95 provides an affirmative right to be represented by counsel
and a concomitant positive duty to provide legal assistance to indigent de-
fendants." The Court has also ruled that a state has an obligation to
provide means for parties to protect their constitutional rights. In Truax
v. Corrigan,97 the Court held that a state could not prohibit injunctions
against striking workers, since to do so would be to leave owners unable to
vindicate the right of free access to their property. As these cases illustrate,
however, the Supreme Court has generally inferred affirmative obligations
90. For a discussion of the distinction between positive and negative rights, see I. BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969); Currie, Positive and Negative Consti-
tutional Rights, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 864, 864-67 (1986); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24-26 (1986).
91. The Final Accounting in the Estate of A.B., 1 Tucker (N.Y. Sur. Rep.) 247, 249 (1866),
quoted in Starkman, State Legislators, Speech or Debate, and the Search for Truth, 11 LoY. U. Cm.
L.J. 69, 69 (1979).
92. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted) (Posner, J.), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
93. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 7-19 (1969); Michelman, Welfare Rights
in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659.
94. See Currie, supra note 90.
95. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
96. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
97. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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only in areas already defined by some level of government coercion. Deci-
sions finding affirmative rights could often be interpreted as merely ensur-
ing the fairness of governmental deprivations of liberty. The Court's deci-
sion this past Term in Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services" reaffirmed a negative rights view, at least in the due
process context: "[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process
Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even
where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property inter-
ests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual."9
This Note has considered the use of the legislative injunction in the
remedy phase of constitutional litigation. Yonkers and Jenkins illustrate
that while the legislative injunction seeks to enforce affirmative legislative
duties, its legitimacy does not depend upon a theory of positive constitu-
tional rights. In accordance with a negative understanding of rights, the
legislative injunction may function simply to protect individuals against
unjust government coercion. In Yonkers and Jenkins, government officials
had engaged in racial discrimination, and legislative action was required
to reverse the effects of this prior wrongdoing. However broadly one views
the mandate for state action, the government certainly has an obligation to
rectify its own improper acts.
The insight motivating the legislative injunction-that inaction does not
constitute a privileged mode of government conduct-does suggest, though,
the weakness of the negative rights model. The courts in Jenkins and Yon-
kers had explicitly held that the existing patterns of school segregation
resulted from illegitimate state action. But state power is already impli-
cated in any existing social setting.' To understand the Constitution as a
shield against government interference is to naturalize the status quo, pre-
ferring the beneficiaries of past state intervention to the petitioners of the
present. Especially in the wake of the New Deal and the increasingly
activist character of the modern administrative state, it is disingenuous for
government to deny responsibility for the current distribution of re-
sources."' 1 Since common law baselines represent prior exercises of state
power, not neutral, apolitical starting points, the insistence of the negative
rights model that it is government action, not inaction, that threatens indi-
viduals' liberty rings false.10 2 The lessons of Yonkers and Jenkins have
98. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
99. Id. at 1003.
100. See Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 103 (1984) ("[11n practice, it is
just about impossible to describe any set of 'basic' social practices without describing the legal rela-
tions among the people involved-legal relations that don't simply condition how the people relate to
each other but to an important extent define the constitutive terms of the relationship ....").
101. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism and the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 501-04 (1987).
102. As Sunstein explains,
The debate over "positive" and "negative" rights ... depends on the choice of baselines.
Whether a right is "positive" or "negative" turns out largely to depend on whether it calls for
alterations in existing practices. The selection of such baselines has been particularly critical in
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broad application: Courts cannot permit government inaction to preserve
the pernicious effects of prior government activity.
Whatever the terms employed to describe the contemporary understand-
ing of the role of rights in regulating the interaction of individuals and the
state, it is clear that legislative inaction should have no privileged place.
Recognizing the theoretical limitations of the negative rights model, courts
may discover unconstitutional legislative inaction in less obvious circum-
stances than the blatant and longstanding disregard for a school desegre-
gation remedy. If courts take a more expansive view of the rights pro-
tected by the Constitution, conflicts between courts and legislatures may
escalate. In addition to helping to demonstrate the limitations of the nega-
tive conception of rights, then, the legislative injunction may also become
an increasingly important constitutional tool.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty-five years, structural litigations have sought to
protect those who require affirmative governmental action to prevent the
deprivation of their life, liberty, or property. As a result of this develop-
ment, an anomaly has arisen in that the vindication of constitutional
rights may seem to depend on the will of the majority as expressed
through the legislature. This appearance must be deceptive, since it is the
very nature of rights that they do not depend on the current preferences of
the people, that they stand above the vagaries of majority rule. In sum, a
fundamental aspect of constitutional rights is that they are not subject to
legislative discretion. By employing the legislative injunction to guarantee
constitutional rights, judges are thus not usurping legislative authority.
Rather, they are creating a new, constitutional baseline, so that the legis-
lators' exercise of discretion, be it through action or inaction, will not ex-
ceed their prerogative by violating constitutional guarantees. It is basic to
the American constitutional system that legislative power is limited. The
legislative injunction ensures that these limits are set not by the status
quo, but by the Constitution.
cases involving the imposition of "affirmative" duties on government. The protection of the
trespass laws is thus generally perceived as a negative guarantee, whereas protection of welfare
rights is viewed as a positive one. Distinctions of this sort turn not on a genuine inquiry into
the negative or positive character of the rights, but on whether they require the government to
depart from common law categories.
Id. at 503 (footnote omitted).
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